Based on the extension Hukuhara difference between interval numbers, a generalized form of cooperative fuzzy games with a coalition structure and interval payoffs is proposed, which can be seen as an extension of crisp case. The interval Owen value for this kind of fuzzy games is studied, and its explicit form is given. When the fuzzy games are convex, the proposed interval Owen value is an interval population monotonic allocation function (IPMAF), and belongs to the associated core. Furthermore, we discuss a special kind of fuzzy games with a coalition structure and interval payoffs, and study the interval Owen value and the core of it. Some properties are also examined, which are coincided with the crisp case.
1． Introduction
The Shapley value (see [1] ) is a well-known solution concept in cooperative game theory. Some researchers (see [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] ) who have investigated the Shapley value have focused their attention on fuzzy coalition and realvalued characteristic function.
In some situations, players can only know imprecise information regarding the real outcome of cooperation. For this kind of games, Mares [7] and Vlach [8] researched games with crisp coalitions and fuzzy payoffs. Borkotokey [9] and Yu and Zhang [10] studied games with fuzzy coalitions and fuzzy payoffs. Since interval numbers can conveniently describe the lower and upper bounds of the coalition values. Alparslan Gök et al. [11, 12] and Branzei et al. [13] researched games with crisp coalitions and interval payoffs. Due to the limitation of fuzzy set operations, the discussions in [10] [11] [12] are all based on the Hukuhara difference (see [14] ) for fuzzy sets directly or indirectly.
In 1977, Owen [15] introduced games with a priori unions which are known as the Owen coalition structures where the probability of cooperation among coalitions is considered. By extending the Shapley value for traditional games, Owen [15] proposed the Owen value for games with a coalition structure. The axiomatic systems of the Owen value are considered in [16] [17] [18] [19] . Later, Owen [20] gave another payoff index for games with a coalition structure, which is called the Banzhaf-Owen value, and discussed its axiomatic system. More researches about axiomatic characterizations of the Banzhaf-Owen value can be International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems, Vol. 6, No. 3 (May, 2013) , 548-558
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Copyright: the authors seen in [21, 22] . Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro [23] pointed the Banzhaf-Owen value dissatisfies symmetry in quotient games, and gave another solution concept for games with a coalition structure, which is known as the symmetric Banzhaf value. But all above researches are only introduced for crisp case.
In this paper, based on the extension Hukuhara difference between interval numbers, we will research cooperative fuzzy games with a coalition structure and interval payoffs. As we will see, the extension Hukuhara difference between interval numbers can be used to more situations than the Hukuhara difference. Inspired by Sprumont [24] , we show the given interval Owen value is an IPMAF when the fuzzy games are convex.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we recall some notations and basic definitions, which will be used in the following. In section 3, an axiomatic definition of the interval Owen value for fuzzy games with a coalition structure and interval payoffs is proposed, and the explicit form of the interval Owen value is given. Meantime, some properties are researched. In section 4, we pay an attention to discuss the interval Owen value for a special kind of fuzzy games with a coalition structure and interval payoffs, which can be seen as an extension of fuzzy games introduced by Tsurumi et al. [4] .
Preliminaries

The Extension Hukuhara Difference between Interval Numbers
Let  and   be the sets of real numbers and positive real numbers, respectively. N  . For any S 0  ( , ) P N  , S 0 is called a feasible coalition, where ( , ) P N  denotes the set of all feasible coalitions in ( , ) N  . Owen [15] gave the Owen value for crisp games with a coalition structure as follows: 
)(i)=S(i)  T(i); S  T denotes the intersection of fuzzy coalitions S and T, namely, i Supp(S  T) if and only if i SuppS  SuppT and (S  T)(i) = S(i)  T(i).
In the following, we will use S={S(i 1 ), S(i 2 ),…,S(i n )} to denote the fuzzy coalition S L(N). Furthermore, the braces will be omitted for singletons, e.g. by writing S,
Similar to the definition of the coalition structure for crisp case introduced by Owen [15] , we give the definition of the coalition structure for fuzzy coalitions as follows:
For any ( , ) U  , the set of the feasible coalitions
is a fuzzy coalition structure in U, where 
U(3),U(4)},{U(2),U(3),U(4)},U}.
Then it is an interval set function belongs to
v is said to be an interval quotient game in ( , )
U  , where 
where If every player's participation level is 1, and the coalition values are real numbers, then Eq. (2) degenerates to be Eq.(1). Furthermore, if there is only one coalition in  , and every player's participation level is 1, then Eq. (2) degenerates to be the Shapley value given by Alparslan Gök et al. [12] . [25, 30] v U  . Since there does not exist interval number c such that ( (1)) ( (1), (2) 
Since this is a symmetry game and every player can get more payoffs than that by himself, we know this cooperative game can be formed. Furthermore, it is not difficult to get the vector ( ( , , ))
is an imputation, and an element in the core of this game.
Although the extension Hukuhara difference between interval numbers can be used to situations than the Hukuhara difference, there exist games with interval numbers which can not use the extension Hukuhara difference. 
Since the payoffs of the players 2 and 4 are "imaginary" interval numbers, which makes no sense.
In order to avoid the above situation, in this paper, for any ( , ) v IG U   we always mean every player's payoff obtained by Eq. (2) is an interval number.
is said to be an interval Owen value for v , if it satisfies the following axioms: 
where r and p denote the cardinalities of R 0 and P 0 , respectively.
Since ( 1) 0
Thus, Eq. 
On the other hand, by Eq.(2) we have ( , , ) 
Namely,  and f coincide on T u . □ From the convexity of 
From recursion method, we have ( , , ) ( , , )
By cases (1) and (2), the conclusion is obtained. □
Proof. 
If there is only one coalition in  , and the coalition values are real numbers, then IPMAF degenerates to be fuzzy population monotonic allocation function introduced by Tsurumi et al. [4] .
Furthermore, if there is only one coalition in  , and the coalition values are real numbers, then the core ( , ) IC U  degenerates to be the core of fuzzy games presented by Yu and Zhang [25] .
A Special Kind of Fuzzy Games with a Coalition Structure and Interval Payoffs
In this section, we shall discuss a special kind of fuzzy games with a coalition structure and interval payoffs, which can be seen as an extension of fuzzy games presented by Tsurumi et al. [4] . Similar to Tsurumi et al. [4] , we give the fuzzy coalition value as follows:
where S is a fuzzy coalition as usual. 
is said to be an interval Owen value for C v , if it satisfies the following axioms: 
From Eq.(5), we get Supp ( , , ) According to Table 2 , we know the associated game 
Conclusion
Based on the extension Hukuhara difference between interval numbers, we have researched the interval Owen value for fuzzy games with a coalition structure and interval payoffs, which extends the researching scope of game theory. Meantime, some properties of the given interval Owen value are studied. In order to better understand this kind of fuzzy games, we further discuss a special kind of fuzzy games with a coalition structure and interval payoffs, which can be seen as an extension of fuzzy games given by Tsurumi et al. [4] . However, we only study the interval Owen value for this kind of fuzzy games, and it will be interesting to discuss other payoff indices on it As a special kind of fuzzy numbers, the researching for fuzzy games with coalition structure and interval {1}  {2}  {3}  {4}  {5}  {1,2}  {2,3}  {2,4} {2,5} {3,4} {3,5} {4,5} {1,2,3} payoffs provides reference to fuzzy games with a coalition structure and fuzzy payoffs.
